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This essay is based on "Explaining the
Pattern of Secured Credit," 111
Harvard Law Review 625 (1997) and
"Strategy and Force in the Liquidation
of Secured Debt," 96 Michigan Law
Review 159 (1997).
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BY RONALD

J. MANN

Secured credit is a dominant feature of the U.S.
economy: inslilulional lenders (including federally
insured depository inslilullons, Insurance
companies and nonbank finance companies) In
Ibis counll'Y currently hold more lhan $2 trillion
dollars of secured debt. Although lhe practice of
secured lending Is widespread, we know
astonishingly little about whal motivates
commercial borrowers and lenders 10 use secured
credtt. Conventional wisdom offers an answer lhal
seems obvious. Lenders lake collateral because II
provides a method of ensuring repayment ii lhe
borrower defaults. The converse, of course, is lhal
borrowers grant collateral because II lowers the
Interest rates lhal they must pay lo their lenders as
compensation for lhe money lhal Ibey borrow.
Thus, lhe commonplace answer focuses on force:
a grant of collateral lo a lender enhances the
lender's abilllY 10 collect its debt bY enhancing lhe
lender's abilllY 10 lake possession of the collateral
by force and sell ii lo satisfy lhe debt
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In an effort to test the accuracy of that
conventional wisdom, I recently
undertook a series of three case studies
(one each at an asset finance company, a
commercial bank, and a life insurance
company) designed to provide a picture
of what actually happens when secured
loans to businesses fall into distress.
Each case study was designed to collect
as random a grnup as practicable of
problem secured loans in the portfolio of
an institutional lender and to study what
happened to those loans. At each lender,
I reviewed files covering about two
dozen distressed commercial loans and
interviewed the executives who had been
responsible for dealing with each loan
during its time of distress.
Although my case studies do not
involve anything approaching a random
sample of all distressed loans, they do
provide a rich picture of secured credit in
action. The results of these case studies
suggest that the conventional wisdom is
wrong. Indeed, I maintain that, in
practice, strategy, not force, is the most
important element of secured credit. The
most important effects of the use of
collateral arise from the ways in which a
grant of collateral influences the actions
the parties take short of forced
liquidation of collateral.
The most direct support of my thesis
is the surprising rarity with which
lenders resort to forced liquidation of
collateral. In my case studies, for
example, lenders took their borrowers
collateral in only six (8.3 percent) of the
72 loans that I studied. And all six of
those transactions were real-estate loans;
none of the distressed personal-property
loans was resolved by a repossession and
foreclosure.

The natural response to those results
is to ask why lenders were so reluctant to
foreclose. Assuming that the lenders were
acting rationally (and it is hard to believe
that large institutional lenders act with a
consistent lack of rationality in
something that affects their profitability
so directly) the only justification for the
consistent practice of forbearance would
be the availability of some alternate
course of action that produced a greater
recovery for the lender than foreclosure.
But given the conventional perception
that it would be easy for a lender to
recover most or all of its debt by means
of foreclosure, it is not immediately
apparent what a lender would do to force
a defaulting borrower to pay that would
be superior to foreclosure.
The answer has two parts: the
relatively high transaction costs of
liquidation and the relatively effective
alternative ways for debtors to repay
their loans. On the liquidation side, my
profiles produced so few foreclosures
that my evidence is largely anecdotal. On
those few transactions, however, the
recoveries were shockingly low. In the six
transactions in which the lender took the
collateral (all of which involved the
insurance company), the lender's net
recovery after it resold the property
resulted in a loss of about $135 million,
more than 75 percent of its original loans
on those projects of just over $170
million. Interviews with executives at the
lenders that I visited indicated that those
loans were not unusual. Lenders
generally expect to lose very large
portions of their investment whenever
they resort to foreclosure.
Although the recoveries in the
foreclosure cases were quite poor, the
results for the lenders in the other cases
(cases in which the lender decided not to

foreclose) were quite good. All of the
loans that I studied involved transactions
in which the lender had decided to
terminate the relationship based on a
serious default or (when the lender was
entitled to terminate a loan relationship
at will) some other basis for dissatisfaction
with the borrower. Nevertheless, in the
cases in which the lenders did not take
possession of the property, the lenders
obtained payment in full (including
interest and any other fees or charges)
about 70 percent of the time.
The ways in which the lenders
obtained payment reflect a variety of
mechanisms that combine to give a
commercial borrower a thoroughly
realistic chance of protecting its
investment in property on which it has
granted a lien. For example, in more
than 20 percent of the loans, the
borrower satisfied the lender with the
proceeds of a refinancing, funds that the
borrower obtained from another lender.
The striking thing about those
transactions is the ability of the borrower,
faced with an imminent foreclosure by
its existing lender, to convince another
lender (often a bank or other institutional
lender) to extend a new loan.
Another 20 percent of the loans were
repaid through cash flow from continued
operations. In those cases (all of which
involved retail businesses), the lenders
(notwithstanding their determination
that the borrowers' financial situations
were so precarious that the lenders were
unwilling to continue their financing
relationships) left the borrowers in
business to sell the inventory (the
lenders collateral) in the ordinary course
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Thus, even though the right to foreclose certainly is part of the reason lenders
take collateral, it cannot explain the Institution as a general matter. That
leaves the root question: If not foreclosure, then what? In mv view, two
significant effects motivate the use of secured credit In commercial lending,
both of which focus on the effect that the grant of collateral has on the
borrower's behavior before the loan falls into distress, not on the lender's
ability to collect after the loan falls Into distress.
of business. The rationale of the lender in
those cases was that repossession would
be senseless, because the borrower could
sell the inventory for a higher price, with
lower transaction costs than the lender.
The pervasiveness of that rationale is
evident from one transaction that I
studied in which a random audit by the
finance company revealed that a
computer retailer for whom the finance
company was financing inventory had
been lying to the lender about its sales
and inventory practices. Notwithstanding
the patent fraud on the part of the
borrower, the finance company left the
retailer in possession, operating its
business, selling the collateral. The value
of that approach was underscored by the
results of that transaction: the lender was
paid in full through sales in the ordinary
course of business less than three months
later. The lender'.s internal projections
suggested that it would have recovered
only about 20 percent of the loan
amount if it had repossessed the
collateral and liquidated it at the time of
the default.
A third approach, slightly less
common but still significant, was to let
the borrower sell the business as a going
concern, with the lender obtaining
payment of its loan from the sale
proceeds. That was the result in another
group of the loans that included slightly
more than 10 percent of the whole
sample. The rationale of the lenders in
those cases resembled the rationale in the
continued-operations cases: the lenders
generally thought that the borrower
would be able to obtain a better price for
the business than the lenders would if
the lenders foreclosed and tried to sell
the business themselves. Accordingly, the
lenders generally were willing to forbear
and allow borrowers to pursue any
realistic possible sales that might produce
funds to repay the lender.
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As I stated above, these findings
suggest that lenders often refrain from
foreclosure in the face of serious defaults
based on a justifiable perception that less
adversarial responses generally produce a
better recovery than foreclosure. If
foreclosure is so rare, and produces such
poor results when it occurs, it is difficult
to accept the conventional view that the
most important feature of secured credit
is that it allows a lender to foreclose on
the collateral. To be sure, there are
contexts in which the foreclosure option
is important, but most of those (home
mortgages and automobiles being the
most obvious) involve loans to
consumers in which the likelihood of
consistently rational actions is much
smaller.
Thus, even though the right to
foreclose certainly is part of the reason
lenders take collateral, it cannot explain
the institution as a general matter. That
leaves the root question: if not foreclosure,
then what? In my view, two significant
effects motivate the use of secured credit
in commercial lending, both of which
focus on the effect that the grant of
collateral has on the borrower's behavior
before the loan falls into distress, not on
the lender's ability to collect after the loan
falls into distress.
The most important answer is that a
grant of security to one lender limits the
borrower's ability to overleverage its
business by obtaining loans from some
other lender at a later time. Imagine a
small-business borrower that obtains a
loan from First Bank. If First Bank did
not take a security interest, it would be
relatively easy for the borrower, shortly
after borrowing the money from First
Bank, to go to Second Bank and borrow
the same amount of money from Second
Bank that the borrower just obtained
from First Bank. Absent the public filing
associated with the security interest,

Second Bank would have no reliable way
to discover that the borrower already had
borrowed money from First Bank. Thus,
Second Bank might make the loan to the
borrower even if the borrower's financial
position was inadequate to support
both loans.
Of course, First Bank could respond
to that problem by requiring the
borrower to promise that the borrower
would not borrow money from Second
Bank (or any other lender), but the law
provides no effective remedy for a
violation of that covenant: once Second
Bank has loaned the money to the
borrower, it hardly would be fair to
invalidate Second Bank's loan as a
remedy for the borrower's deceit in
hiding the First Bank transaction from
Second Bank. And if the law does not
invalidate the borrower's obligation to
repay Second Bank, then the law can do
nothing to repair the damage that First
Bank suffers from its borrower's
overextended financial condition.
Interestingly, that problem does not arise
for public companies, because it is so
easy for lenders to discover prior
significant loan transactions by public
companies. That distinction helps
explain the rarity of secured debt issued
by public companies.
In addition to its capacity to limit
excessive subsequent borrowing, secured
credit also aids a lender by enhancing the
ability of the lender to control the
borrower's day-to-day conduct.
Essentially, a grant of collateral gives the
lender leverage over the borrower that
motivates the borrower to refrain from
risky activities that threaten the
likelihood that the business will survive
long enough to repay the loan. The
leverage arises from the ability of the
lender to take the collateral from the
borrower promptly upon a default.
When the collateral is necessary to
continuation of the borrower's business,
as it often is, action by the lender to
repossess the collateral could destroy the

borrower's business overnight, inflicting a
loss that far exceeds any,plausible
valuation of the collateral standing alone.
The possibility that lenders would inflict
such losses gives borrowers a strong
motivation to run their business on a
daily basis in a way that conforms to
their lenders' expectations. By enhancing
the ability of the lender to control its
borrower, secured credit decreases the
likelihood that the borrower will engage
in activity harmful to the lender, and
thus indirectly increases the likelihood
that the borrower will repay the loan
as agreed.
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